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SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SOME: THE PALESTINIANS 
AND THE UYGHURS IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
BRIAN YEH* 
Self-determination is attractive so long as it has not been attained; 
alternatively, it is attractive so long as it is applied to others. Once realized, 
enthusiasm dies fast, since henceforth, it can only be used to undermine 




China’s first ever white paper publicly outlining its policy 
toward the greater Middle East affirmed Beijing’s support for the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as well as an independent 
Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as 
its capital.  Beijing’s support for Palestinian independence stands in 
stark contrast and apparent tension with its oppression of its 
Uyghur minority, who, like the Palestinians, aspire to an 
independent state of their own in present-day Xinjiang.  What 
explains China’s continued support for an independent, Muslim-
majority Palestinian state despite its brutal crackdown of its own 
Muslim minority at home?  Drawing on the literature on sovereignty 
and self-determination, I argue that these policy positions are not 
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inconsistent, and can indeed by reconciled.  As a doctrinal matter, 
international law has differentiated between permissible self-
determination claims in the context of decolonization on the one 
hand, and impermissible secessionist claims on the other.  In its 
foreign relations, China has consistently highlighted this distinction 
and characterized Xinjiang as an integral part of Chinese territory, 
with the necessary implication that Uyghur self-determination 
claims are irredentist in nature.  Whatever the legalities, in practice, 
China has managed to reconcile these policies due in no small part 
to its significant economic and political leverage and its framing of 
its Uyghur policy as a security issue immune from criticism.  By 
maintaining this careful balancing act, China has facilitated—or at 
least eliminated one possible roadblock to—the creation of a greater 
role for itself in the Middle East, while not abandoning its historical 
support for the Palestinians or emboldening secessionist 
movements at home.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In its first ever white paper publicly laying out China’s policy 
toward the greater Middle East, the Chinese government devoted 
just two lines to the subject of Palestine, affirming its support for 
“the Middle East peace process and the establishment of an 
independent state of Palestine with full sovereignty, based on the 
pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”2  China, the 
paper continued, “supports the Arab League and its member states’ 
efforts to this end.”3  Belying the white paper’s cursory treatment of 
the country’s Palestine policy, China has for several decades 
staunchly advocated for the cause of Palestinian self-
determination—a position borne out of a rich tradition of anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.  In the mid-1960s, for 
example, China provided significant material and moral support to 
various Palestinian guerrilla factions4 and became the first non-Arab 
country to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as an 
independent entity.5  More recently, China supported Palestine’s 
successful bid to acquire “non-member observer state” status at the 
United Nations in 2012,6 and in July of 2017, announced a four-point 
Middle East peace plan reaffirming support for an independent 
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.7 
 
 2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arab 
Policy Paper (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/LW7L-CMPK]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Lillian Craig Harris, China’s Relations with the PLO, 7 J. PALESTINE STUDIES 123, 
123 (1977) (stating the close relations between the People’s Republic of China and 
the Palestinian guerrilla organization). 
 5 John K. Cooley, China and the Palestinians, 1 J. PALESTINE STUDIES 19, 25 (1972) 
(demonstrating that “Rashid Jarbou was appointed first PLO envoy in Peking, with 
what amounted to diplomatic status. China thus became the first non-Arab country 
in the world to recognize the PLO as an independent entity.”). 
 6  See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes 
Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in 
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/729U-
KABC] (noting Chinese ambassador Baodong Li’s remark that the resolution 
represented “another positive step in Palestine’s progress toward statehood.”). 
 7 Press Release, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
U.N., Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Open Debate on 
the Middle East (July 25, 2017), http://www.china-
un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1481733.htm [https://perma.cc/K79A-PHYH]. 
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China’s support for Palestinian self-determination, though 
fitting comfortably into its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist foreign 
policy tradition, stands in stark contrast to—and in apparent tension 
with—its oppressive treatment of its Uyghur minority, a Turkic 
Muslim people who live in China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region.  Although the Uyghurs and the Palestinians 
are separated in many respects by geography, language, culture, 
and identity, the similarities between the two peoples and their 
circumstances have led some observers to decry the 
“Palestinization” of Xinjiang, a term coined by Chinese dissident 
Lixiong Wang to describe the “full mobilization of a people and the 
full extent of its hatred” toward the State.8  Indeed, apart from being 
predominantly Muslim, both the Palestinians and the Uyghurs view 
themselves as being victims of occupation and oppression—
Palestinians by the Israelis, the Uyghurs at the hands of the Han 
Chinese majority.9  Like the Palestinians, the Uyghurs also aspire to 
an independent state of their own, one in present-day Xinjiang 
called East Turkestan.  Moreover, many Uyghurs have expressed 
sympathy for and found common cause with the Palestinians, 
whom they view as enduring a plight similar to theirs.10 
In contrast to Chinese support for Palestinian self-
determination, however, China’s policy towards the Uyghurs has 
been characterized by a lack of even modest self-determination or 
self-governance, despite what Xinjiang’s official name might imply.  
Over the past decade, Beijing’s control over this region has come 
under growing international scrutiny as bouts of ethnic violence 
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese have been met with a 
disproportionate security crackdown by the central government.  In 
2009, for example, Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi was rocked by deadly 
 
      8 Wang Lixion, Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View 
on the Kunming Incident, CHINA EXCHANGE (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://chinachange.org/2014/03/03/excerpts-from-my-west-china-your-east-
turkestan-my-view-on-the-kunming-incident/ [https://perma.cc/FHG4-7ENM]; 
see also Michael Clarke, China and the Uyghurs: The “Palestinization” of Xinjiang?, 
MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL, https://mepc.org/china-and-uyghurs-
palestinization-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/FD9M-WZRZ] (suggesting in 2011 that 
“[w]hile the situation in Xinjiang has not reached this point . . . the beginnings of 
the Palestinization of the region are discernable at three levels.”). 
 9 See DANIEL JAMES SCHUSTER, RESISTING UNDER OCCUPATION: A PALESTINIAN-
UYGHUR COMPARISON 10-12 (2017) (describing the similarities between the Uyghurs 
and the Palestinians). 
 10 See Joanne Smith Finley, Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern 
Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities Among the Uyghurs, 16 J. CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 627, 652 (2007). 
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rioting that left more than 100 people dead,11 and at least twenty-
nine people were killed by Uyghur assailants during a mass 
stabbing attack at a train station in Kunming in 2014.12  In the period 
between these attacks, China responded by investing millions of 
dollars in security infrastructure and personnel to create a “multi-
tiered security state” within Xinjiang to prevent further attacks.13  
Most recently, Beijing has drawn intense international 
condemnation after reports emerged that it has forced more than 
one million Uyghurs and other minorities into mass detention 
camps that Beijing describes as “job-training centers,” but which a 
growing body of evidence suggests are a network of forced labor 
camps intended to erase the cultural and religious identity of the 
Uyghurs and induce them to swear fealty to the Chinese Communist 
Party.14  While this and other security crackdowns conducted under 
the banner of the Strike Hard Campaign have been justified as a 
prudent response to the problem of international terrorism in the 
aftermath of September 11th,15 they represent a part of a broader 
 
 11 Chris Buckley, Xinjiang Riot Toll Hits 156 as Unrest Spreads, REUTERS (July 6, 
2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-
idUSTRE5650SW20090706 [https://perma.cc/58ZM-F5JE].  
 12 Andrew Jacobs, Train Station Rampage Further Strains Ethnic Relations in 
China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/han-uighur-relations-
china.html [https://perma.cc/72ZS-5D5D].  
 13 Adrian Zenz & James Leibold, Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State, 15 
CHINA BRIEF 4 (Mar. 14, 2017); Andrew Jacobs, Train Station Rampage Further 
Strains Ethnic Relations in China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/han-uighur-relations-
china.html [https://perma.cc/QRK6-L4X4].  
 14   See, e.g., Chris Buckley & Austin Ramzy, China’s Detention Camps for 
Muslims Turn to Forced Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-
labor-camps-uighurs.html [https://perma.cc/HQ37-Q79K]; Austin Ramzy & 
Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass 
Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-
documents.html [https://perma.cc/U4U6-D4M8]. 
 15 James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, EAST-
WEST CENTER, 11 (2004), 
https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/PS006.pdf?file=1&type=n
ode&id=32006  [https://perma.cc/47V8-QT35] (“Following the September 11 al 
Qaeda attacks on the United States, official PRC pronouncements began to stress 
the threat of ‘terrorism’ in Xinjiang as China’s leadership maneuvered to position 
itself ‘side by side with the United States in the war against terror.’ This apparently 
required a revision of the official description of separatists in Xinjiang. What had 
generally been described as a handful of separatists was now a full-blown ‘terrorist 
organization.’”) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/5
2020] Palestinians and Uyghurs in China’s Foreign Policy 1143 
effort by Beijing to suppress the identity and national aspirations of 
the Uyghur people through a variety of social, political, and 
economic means.16  As indicated in a 2002 document released by the 
Information Office of the State Council entitled “‘East Turkistan’ 
Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,”  these efforts 
stem from Beijing’s fear of attempts by Uyghur separatists—known 
as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement17—to form an independent 
state called East Turkestan within the borders of present-day 
Xinjiang.18 
With such actual and perceived threats to its rule in Xinjiang, 
what explains China’s continued support for an independent, 
Muslim-majority Palestinian state?  Can its efforts to squelch ethnic 
separatism in Xinjiang be reconciled with a policy of support for 
Palestinian self-determination?  Drawing on the literature on 
sovereignty and self-determination, I argue that these two policy 
positions are not inconsistent.  Doctrinally, and as a matter of 
international law, self-determination that results in independence is 
much more robust and widely accepted in the context of 
decolonization than secession.  In practice, the Chinese government 
has carefully hewed to this distinction in its foreign relations, 
voicing support for the right of non-self-governing peoples to self-
determination, while at the same time condemning separatist 
movements and characterizing Xinjiang (like Taiwan and Tibet) as 
indisputably Chinese territory.  
Whatever the legalities, the politics of foreign policy are such 
that in the modern era, China has managed to comfortably voice 
weak rhetorical support for the Palestinians while effectively 
 
 16 See, e.g., Staff of the Global Legal Research Center of the Law Library of 
Congress, Report for U.S. Department of Justice, Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic 
Group in the Peoples Republic of China, 5–8 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/
30/loc_03-2015_china.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL5K-A2GA] (discussing restrictions 
on Uyghurs’ religious practices, language, and cultural identity); Human Rights 
Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang (Apr. 11, 2005), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/11/devastating-blows/religious-
repression-uighurs-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/ZA4X-HJME]. 
 17  Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher & Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim 
[https://perma.cc/T7D2-2FJR]. 
 18  CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER, ”East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces 
Cannot Get Away With Impunity, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/25582.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GFN7-65VY]. 
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muffling any criticisms of its policy toward its Uyghur minority at 
home.  Indeed, China has managed to successfully frame the 
Uyghur issue as a security issue in its relations with its regional 
neighbors, an effort aided in no small part by its significant 
economic and political leverage.  Indeed, even countries most 
sympathetic to the plight of the Uyghurs, such as Turkey, have 
increasingly shied away from taking any meaningful steps to hold 
China accountable for its oppression of the Uyghurs.  By 
maintaining this careful balancing act, China has managed to stake 
a position that simultaneously facilitate a greater role for itself in the 
Middle East, while not abandoning its historical support for a 
revolutionary ally or emboldening secessionist sentiments at home. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Part 2, I discuss the legal and 
political norm of self-determination and its relation to the law of 
statehood in the international system.  I show that the distinction the 
international community has drawn between self-determination in 
the decolonization context and secession has been embraced by the 
Chinese government in its foreign relations.  In Part 3, I provide an 
overview of China’s relationship with Palestine, focusing both on 
the historical origins of the relationship and its contemporary 
manifestations.  Part 4 discusses China’s control over Xinjiang, with 
an analysis of the implications of China’s policies vis-à-vis the 
Uyghurs on its foreign relations.  In Part 5, I discuss why Chinese 
support for Palestinian self-determination and its policies toward 
the Uyghurs are not incompatible, as well as the extent to which 
China itself has attempted to reconcile these positions.  In particular, 
I argue that it is unlikely that China rhetorically supports Palestinian 
independence as a means of asserting influence in the Middle East; 
that support predates China’s interest in expanding its footprint in 
the region and has faded, and Beijing has, moreover, cultivated 
closer political and military ties with Israel in recent years while 
supporting the broader “peace process” led by the international 
community. 
2. SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CHINESE POSITION 
Most commonly associated with President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points, the notion of self-determination can be traced to 
geopolitical developments that swept through eighteenth and 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/5
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nineteenth century Europe19—and perhaps even earlier still.20  Self-
determination is generally understood to be “[t]he proposition . . . 
that every people should freely determine its own political status 
and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural development.”21  
It can be exercised in the form of secession, association in a 
federation, or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary state.22  As it 
was first conceptualized, however, self-determination was 
understood to inure to the benefit only of states, as it was first 
manifested in the European contests for power that led to the 
creation of new nation-states in the aftermath of the disintegration 
of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.23  Since that time, 
neither the status nor the content of self-determination have been 
identified with precision,24  and today there exists no universally 
agreed-upon definition of what self-determination means.25 
As to status, Professor Brownlie notes that self-determination 
has been referred to variously as a political principle, a legal 
principle, and a legal right.26  Self-determination was first enshrined 
as a “principle” in 1945 in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which did not, however, define its meaning.27  Although 
 
 19  HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 
(1996). 
 20  See CASSESE, supra note 1, at 14-23 (arguing that the precursor to self-
determination was the refrain heard during the French and American revolutions 
that sovereignty belonged to the people).  See also KRISTINA ROEPSTORFF, THE 
POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: BEYOND THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS 10-11 
(2013). 
 21  John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 193 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984).  See 
also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 647 (8th 
ed. 2012) (defining self-determination as a general matter as “the right of a 
community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the 
institutions under which it lives”). 
 22 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 141. 
 23 See HANNUM, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
 24 See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 309 (6th ed. 2009) (“Notwithstanding its treatment in legal 
documents and decisions, the concept of self-determination remains fraught with 
uncertainty . . .”); HANNUM, supra note 19, at 27 (“[T]he meaning and content of that 
right remain as vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President 
Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles.”). 
 25 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 646. 
 26  Id. 
 27 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 307.  It was also recognized as a 
principle in non-treaty instruments such as the UN Declaration of Friendly 
Relations. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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that principle was mentioned only twice in the U.N. Charter and not 
at all in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,28 self-
determination thereafter “evolved” into a right when the U.N. 
Declaration on Colonial Countries declared that “[a]ll peoples have 
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”29  It was subsequently recognized 
as a right in treaty instruments such as the International Covenant 
on Social and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well.30  Despite this wide 
recognition of a “right” to self-determination, a series of decisions 
rendered by the International Court of Justice has left self-
determination’s status as a right under international law somewhat 
in doubt.  As Professor Jan Klabbers notes, while the ICJ in the South 
West Africa case “displayed a conception of self-determination as a 
substantive right that accrues to peoples,”31 it consciously avoided 
using the term “right” in its Western Sahara opinion four years 
later—opting instead to refer to the “principle” of self-
determination. 32   Adding to this uncertainty, there exists some 
scholarly disagreement as to whether the principle of self-
determination is a rule of customary international law, jus cogens, or 
not a rule of law at all.33 
Regardless of the status accorded to self-determination under 
international law, it is apparent that as a general principle, self-
determination “will continue to be a major political force both 
internationally and domestically.” 34   In the post-Cold War era, 
however, the locus of the debate has centered on the scope of self-
determination itself 35 : to whom it applies, what practical 
consequences its realization should entail, the circumstances under 
which self-determination may be exercised, and how it is to be 
 
 28 HANNUM, supra note 19, at 33. 
 29 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
 30 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 308. 
 31  Jan Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in 
International Law, 28 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 186, 191 (2006). 
 32 Id. at 195-96. 
 33 HANNUM, supra note 19, at 44-45. 
 34 Id. at 49. 
 35 ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 31. 
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reconciled with conflicting principles of international law.36  As a 
practical matter, it is well established that peoples living under 
colonial rule 37  and foreign occupation 38  have the right to self-
determination. Indeed, self-determination’s emergence as a more 
precise, substantive principle under international law took place 
with the articulation of the so-called “salt-water theory of 
decolonization,” which required as a condition precedent to self-
determination a people living “in a distinct overseas territory with 
an ocean separating them from the respective colonial power.”39  
This theory of self-determination came to guide United Nations 
practice during the decolonization period. 40   In this context, 
international law recognizes the right of colonized people to 
independence.41 
Although a “pronounced distinction” has developed between 
self-determination in the colonial and non-colonial contexts,42 the 
increase in the number of self-determination claims outside of the 
colonial context in the post-Cold War era—such as the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and separatist movements in the Caucasus and 
Africa—has posed a challenge to the viability of this paradigm43 and 
highlighted a parallel distinction between external and internal self-
determination.44  That distinction arose, in part, to limit secession to 
a very limited set of circumstances.45   In its famous Reference re: 
 
 36 See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 309 (citing EDWARD MCWHINNEY, 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND A NEW WORLD ORDER FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM: SELF-
DETERMINATION, STATE SUCCESSION, AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2000); JAMES 
R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-48 (2d ed. 2006)). 
 37 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 646. 
 38 See id. (noting that self-determination “has been understood as the right of 
peoples under colonial, foreign, or alien domination to self-government”); CASSESE, 
supra note 1, at 90 (observing that “[s]tate practice and United Nations resolutions 
make it clear that external self-determination is a right belonging not only to 
colonial peoples but also to peoples subject to foreign occupation.”). 
 39 ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 15. 
 40  See DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 207 
(2002). 
 41 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 14. 
 42 Id. at 647; see also HANNUM, supra note 19, at 46 (noting that the right to self-
determination has been sharply limited to the colonial context and that no state has 
ever recognized the right of self-determination of all peoples). 
 43 ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 31; see also DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 
24, at 309. 
 44 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 141. 
 45 MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: “SELFISTANS,” SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS 22 (2013). 
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Secession of Quebec decision, the Canadian Supreme Court 
expounded upon the difference between internal and external self-
determination, describing the former as  “a people’s pursuit of its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the 
framework of an existing state”46 and the latter as a right that “arises 
in only the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully 
defined circumstances.”47  As with other aspects of the law on self-
determination, the notions of internal self-determination and 
secession continue to arouse controversy.48  This is especially true 
for the concept of remedial secession, which holds that a people that 
is subjected to gross and systematic human rights abuses can break 
away from a state that is committing those abuses against it.49 
Additionally, contemporary claims of self-determination are 
problematic in the legal sense in at least two respects.  As an initial 
matter, the international instruments speaking to the right of self-
determination of “peoples” do not establish whether the right to 
self-determination in general may be exercised outside the context 
of decolonization.50  Moreover, external self-determination claims, 
such as those espoused by separatist movements, lie in obvious 
tension with the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, as well as the principle of uti possidetis, which 
prioritizes the stability of international boundaries.51  As Professor 
Milena Sterio writes, these two norms interact such that “an act of 
external self-determination, resulting in secession, not covered by 
the right to colonial self-determination is typically (yet not always) 
considered unlawful in international law.” 52   In a state-centric 
system that prioritizes order and stability and in which acquiring 
defined and fixed territory is a prerequisite to participation in such 
a system, 53  it is not altogether unsurprising that limits to the 
 
 46 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 47 Id. 
 48 CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 142. 
 49  Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) 
Practice, 6 ST. ANTHONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 38 (2010). 
 50 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 309; see also Milena Sterio, Self-
Determination and Secession Under International Law: The New Framework, 21 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 293 (2015) (“[I]nternational law is silent on the issue of 
whether a non-colonized minority group ever accrues the positive right to 
remedially.”). 
 51 STERIO, supra note 45, at 21. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination: 
An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 503, 506-08 (2008). 
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assertion of self-determination claims outside of the colonial context 
have developed—particularly with respect to those claims that 
could result in the fracturing of international borders. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding the status and 
scope of self-determination under international law, the People’s 
Republic of China—in both its statements and in practice—has 
adhered to a clear distinction between what it perceives as legitimate 
claims to self-determination in the decolonization context on the one 
hand, and illegitimate secessionist claims on the other.  For example, 
in a written statement submitted to the International Court of Justice 
in the question of the Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government of Kosovo, China declared: 
Although the principle of self-determination has become a 
basic principle of international law, it applies within specific 
limits, primarily restricted to situations of colonial rule or 
foreign occupation . . . The right of self-determination is 
different in nature from the so-called right of secession.  The 
exercise of the right of self-determination shall not 
undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
State concerned.54 
Similarly, in a 2004 statement before the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights concerning the situation in Israel and Palestine, a 
Chinese envoy expressed China’s unequivocal support for the 
struggle for self-determination and independence of colonized 
peoples while explicitly distinguishing attempts to secede from 
sovereign states: 
The right of peoples to self-determination, which was 
historically important, was a powerful weapon for the 
oppressed nations to fight against imperialism and 
colonialism so as to win their national independence and the 
liberation of their peoples, is still of great relevance today.  In 
the contemporary world, the right to self-determination is a 
sacred principle.  It means that each people can choose its 
own political and social system as well as its own economic 
 
 54  Written Statement of the People's Republic of China to the International 
Court of Justice on the Issue of Kosovo, in letter dated Apr. 16 2009 from the Amb. 
of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of the Netherlands addressed to 
the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, https://www.icj-
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model and path to development, oppose foreign aggression, 
interference and control, and safeguard sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. 
. . . 
At the same time, we should be aware that there are some 
people, who, with their evil intention, openly advocate the 
splitting of sovereign states under the cloak of self-
determination.  Such practice also tramples upon the U.N. 
Charter and the fundamental principles of international law 
and deserves the condemnation and firm opposition from all 
peoples of the world.55 
In part, the distinction that China has drawn between legitimate 
claims of self-determination and illegitimate secessionist claims can 
be traced to its strong anti-colonial foreign policy and support for 
developing countries.  During the 1960s and 1970s, facing what it 
perceived as a “hostile” international strategic environment, China 
provided both rhetorical and material support for various national 
liberation movements in Africa in part to counter Soviet 
“revisionism” and American imperialism, as well as to compete for 
influence against the Nationalist government in Taiwan. 56   The 
essence of China’s foreign policy during this period was captured in 
Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1975 declaration that “[t]he Third World is the 
main force in combating colonialism, imperialism, and 
hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to 
the Third World.”57  Similarly, in 1963, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi stated: “China will support revolutions against imperialism 
and oppression. This is not to say that we are behind all revolutions 
. . .  But China will support foreign revolutions both morally and 
politically. We are Marxists.”58 
 
 55 Press Release, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
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As Professor George Yu documents, beginning in the 1950s, 
Africa came to occupy an important part of Chinese foreign policy, 
with China concluding a variety of friendship, cultural, commercial, 
and economic aid agreements with newly-independent African 
countries in part by appealing to anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
sentiment, as well as a sense of Asian-African unity.59  As part of its 
African foreign policy, China took the position that only when all 
African countries became free would the fight against colonialism 
end, and advocated armed struggle as one means of achieving that 
goal. 60   China’s overtures to Africa were not divorced from the 
geopolitical reality taking place around it, however, and it 
emphasized as well that colonialism would not end so long as the 
forces of imperialism continued to present a threat.61  Additionally, 
China emphasized  Asian and African peoples’ common experience 
with imperialist and colonial subjugation by Europeans and 
Americans and the importance of mutual cooperation.62  It should 
be noted, however, that China did not support all national liberation 
movements, declining to do so where they might implicate its 
national interests.63  For example, while exhibiting at least passing 
support for the Eritrea Liberation Front, China simultaneously 
sought closer relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.64  
Similarly, China declined to support independence fighters in East 
Pakistan, opting instead to support the military authorities in West 
Pakistan.65 
To this day, China continues to draw explicitly on its own 
experiences with colonialism and imperialism in addressing self-
determination, decolonization, and secessionist issues abroad.  For 
example, in a written statement submitted to the ICJ on the Legal 
Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius 
in 1965 (Request for Advisory Opinion), China stated: 
Once a victim of aggression and oppression under 
imperialism and colonialism, China sympathizes with the 
peoples under colonial rule and knows full well their 
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sufferings.  The Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China solemnly states in its preamble that “China 
consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and 
colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of 
other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the 
developing countries in their just struggle to win and 
preserve national independence and develop their national 
economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and 
promote the cause of human progress”.  On the international 
stage, China firmly supports the efforts made by the United 
Nations to help colonial countries and peoples exercise their 
right to self-determination and achieve independence, takes 
an active part in the United Nations’ work of decolonization, 
and gives strong support, both politically and economically, 
to colonial countries and peoples, including African 
countries.66 
Consistent with this position, in the contemporary era China has 
continued to support movements for independence from colonial 
rule while vigorously condemning secessionist movements 
elsewhere.  For example, China played a role in East Timor’s first 
bid for independence in the 1970s when it backed the Frente 
Revolucionaria de Timore-Leste Independente Party’s (FRETILIN) 
declaration of independence from Portugal. 67   When, after a 
purported Indonesian annexation and a subsequent referendum, 
East Timor became fully independent in 2002, China was also the 
first country to establish formal diplomatic ties with the country. 
Since 2005, it has been a major funder of construction and 
infrastructure projects in the country in part to counterbalance U.S. 
influence in the region and to lure the country away from support 
for Taiwan. 68   When, on the other hand, Kosovo declared 
independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, a spokesperson for 
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the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed “grave concern” warning 
that “[t]he unilateral move taken by Kosovo will lead to a series of 
consequences.” 69   Later, in 2009, China submitted a written 
statement to the ICJ backing Serbia and arguing that U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which called for Kosovo to “enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 
and which reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” furnished the only basis for 
resolution of the Kosovo issue.70  Moreover, it made its first oral 
argument before the ICJ for the first time since the 1960s in support 
of Serbia’s position.71  Notwithstanding China’s vocal support for 
self-determination in the decolonization context and its opposition 
to secession, China’s stances on these issues have not been 
altogether entirely consistent.  Indeed, as the cases of Hong Kong 
and Crimea illustrate, its policy of supporting self-determination 
claims (or not) does not adhere to rigid and inflexible rules but 
rather is informed by China’s present strategic interests. 
For example, almost three months after the People’s Republic of 
China reassumed China’s seat at the United Nations, it successfully 
lobbied for Hong Kong to be removed from the U.N. Decolonization 
Committee’s list of colonial territories, arguing that Hong Kong (as 
well as Macau) was a Chinese territory that Britain had colonized on 
the basis of unequal treaties.72  The case of Crimea provides another 
interesting counterpoint to China’s policy of distinguishing between 
permissible self-determination claims and impermissible irredentist 
movements.  On March 16, 2014, in a referendum criticized by 
Western observers as illegitimate, Crimea voted to secede from 
Ukraine and become a part of Russia.73  The United States and the 
European Union swiftly condemned the move, with President 
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Obama telling Russian president Vladimir Putin in a phone call that 
the results of the referendum “would never be recognized by the 
United States and the international community.” 74   By contrast, 
China’s reaction was much more equivocal.  For example, it 
abstained from a vote on a Security Council resolution condemning 
the referendum as illegal, which was ultimately blocked by Russia.75  
Later, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang issued a statement 
on the Security Council vote, which reads, in part: 
China always respects all countries’ sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.  It is a basic diplomatic principle that has 
long been upheld by China.  We believe that due to the 
complex historical and practical factors, we should take 
everything into consideration when dealing with the 
Ukraine issue.  China disapproves of confrontation. The U.N. 
Security Council’s vote on the draft resolution will only lead 
to confrontation among all parties, which will further 
complicate the situation.  It goes against the common 
interests of the Ukrainian people and the international 
community.  Under the current circumstances, China calls on 
all parties to keep calm, exercise restraint and refrain from 
raising the tension.  What is imperative now is to push for a 
political settlement.76 
Given China’s strong relations with Russia77—the two countries 
regularly participate in joint military drills and growing trade and 
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investment links78—it was perhaps not altogether unsurprising that 
China avoided condemning the secession referendum outright.  
Nevertheless, its position stands in stark contrast to China’s 
opposition to separatist movements that challenge the territorial 
integrity of sovereign states. Some Western observers have 
suggested that China’s position on Crimea was driven in part by its 
concern about secessionist movements at home.   For example, one 
journalist wrote that, “the way China responds to Crimean 
separatism highlights Beijing’s refusal to recognise similar demands 
for political autonomy in its own backyard.  If China respects 
Crimean demands to dictate their own political future, why not 
those in Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan?”79  Similarly, noting that Chinese 
authorities had allegedly prohibited domestic media outlets from 
linking Crimea to the country’s problems with Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
Taiwan, another observer wrote that “it’s also dangerous for Beijing 
to go on record as supporting the secession of a piece of territory 
based on ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences.” 80   Similar 
comments from Western observers and publications abound.81  By 
contrast, Lihua Zhang, a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua 
Center for Global Policy, traces China’s position on Crimea to three 
underlying themes.  First, she argues that China’s refusal to vote in 
favor of the UN Security Council’s resolution was an implicit rebuke 
at what it perceives as the United States and its European allies’ 
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attempts to broaden their influence in Eastern Europe.82  Second, she 
argues that “[t]he Crimean referendum was an internal Ukrainian 
issue” and that, guided by its Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, China did not wish to intervene in Ukraine’s internal 
affairs.83  Finally, Zhang argues that Russia and Ukraine have long 
had a complicated history and that it was understandable for Russia 
to consider Ukraine “as a part of its sphere of influence and as a 
defensive zone between itself and the EU.”84 
As is evident from China’s sometimes inconsistent positions on 
secessionist movements abroad, its decision to recognize or not 
recognize the legitimacy of those movements and their claims rests 
in no small part on broader strategic considerations and national 
interests.  As one scholar has noted, with respect to China’s 
relationship with the Palestinians, “[t]he twin bases of China’s 
action in the world outside are ideology and national interest. The 
two are often interdependent, but sometimes they seem to clash.”85  
The rest of this paper seeks to identify whether and to what extent 
these ideological and national interests explain China’s continued 
support for an independent Palestinian state in light of its 
secessionist troubles at home, and whether that policy can be 
reconciled within the established framework that China has 
followed in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate 
claims of self-determination. 
3. CHINA AND THE PALESTINIANS: FROM REVOLUTIONARY 
PARTNERS TO SYMBOLIC ALLIES 
A full historical account of China’s relationship with the 
Palestinians is beyond the scope of this paper.  Nevertheless, it is 
sufficient to note that China’s support for Palestine has been both 
longstanding and driven by its historical experience of subjugation 
at the hands of foreign powers, as well as broader strategic interests.  
For example, in his first speech to the United Nations in 1971, 
Chinese delegate Qiao Guanhua declared: 
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The intrinsic nature of the Middle East question lies in the 
aggression against the Palestinian people and the other Arab 
peoples committed by Israeli Zionism, with the support and 
connivance of the superpowers.  The Chinese government 
and people give their resolute support to the Palestinian 
people and the other Arab peoples against aggression and 
are convinced that, in persevering in their struggle and 
maintaining unity, the heroic Palestinians and the other Arab 
peoples will surely be able to recover their lost territories and 
re-establish the Palestinian people in its national rights. 
No one has the right to seek to conclude political deals 
behind the backs of the Palestinians and other Arabs so as to 
injure their right to existence and their other national 
interests.86 
Reflecting this interest in the Palestinian cause, a map published 
in the Peking Review in 1968 lists Palestine as one of twelve 
“revolutionary” zones of interest to China.87  As scholar John Cooley 
notes, both China and Palestine were “invaded, attacked and 
humiliated by foreigners.  The result in both cases was a profound 
case of culture shock.”88  In offering assistance to the Palestinians’ 
struggle against the Israelis, China thus characterized its assistance 
as that of “revolutionary peoples” helping one another.89  Indeed, 
China viewed Palestine as being in the national-democratic stage of 
an eventual socialist revolution; China was eager to lend its 
assistance in the hopes of demonstrating that its model of socialist 
revolution was both realistic and attainable.90  China’s interest in the 
Palestinians also may have been due to its desire to combat 
imperialism in the region and to counter Soviet influence in the 
region.91 
Another reason for Chinese support of the Palestinians during 
this period was China’s desire to use Palestine as a base to further 
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project its influence throughout the Middle East.92  Despite having 
established relations with Egypt and Syria by the mid-1950s, China’s 
relationship with Arab countries slowly deteriorated in the early 
1960s over various disputes with Arab leaders, such as Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s 1959 decision to back rebels in Tibet93 and an increased 
Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria.94  Despite this, or perhaps as a 
consequence of these circumstances, China began to shore up its 
support for the Palestinians and, at least rhetorically, attempted to 
link Palestine with the broader interests of Arab countries.  In 1964, 
for example, Zhou Enlai declared, “We are ready to help the Arab 
nations to regain Palestine.  Whenever you are ready, say the word. 
You will find us ready.  We are willing to give you anything and 
everything; arms and volunteers.” 95   Following this declaration, 
China, among others things, announced that it would comply with 
the decisions of the Arab Office for the Boycott of Israel and began 
to support the Palestinian political faction Fatah.96  The creation of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization allowed China to publicize its 
support for the Palestinian cause,97 and, in 1965, China became the 
first non-Arab country to recognize the PLO as an independent 
entity.98 
Beginning in 1965, China began providing significant material 
and moral support for the Palestinians. That year, China agreed to 
provide the Palestinians with diplomatic, economic, and military aid 
in an agreement that would see that aid channeled through the PLO 
as an umbrella organization to other Palestinian factions.99  Reports 
also indicate that, prior to the 1967 War, China provided a steady 
stream of arms and training to Palestinian forces through various 
ports in the region.100  Verbally, China expressed support for the 
Arab governments in the days before the Israeli offensive, and even 
after the Arab countries were defeated, Zhou Enlai urged Ahmad 
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Shukaieiri, the first chairman of the PLO, to continue armed struggle 
and “fight on unflinchingly to final victory.”101  As a general matter, 
however, it appears that Chinese support for the Palestinians was 
marked by occasional meetings between officials from the two 
governments and did not extend to directing the day-to-day 
activities of their Palestinian counterparts.102 
Since the 1970s, however, the revolutionary fervor that once 
characterized China’s early support for the Palestinians has 
dissipated.103  For example, it appears China did not support any 
factions during the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975—including 
Palestinian ones—when years before any conflict involving 
Palestinian groups would have prompted a firm response from the 
Chinese.104  Moreover, China has evinced a preference for the more 
moderate Palestinian factions, such as Fatah, while also publicly 
calling on them to renounce the use of violence and to stop 
committing acts of international terrorism105—in stark contrast to 
China’s earlier funneling of weapons to the Palestinians and calls for 
armed struggle in the region.  Indeed, China deleted the term 
“armed” in front of “struggle” in its 1974 and 1976 statements on 
Palestine to the United Nations.106 
Particularly in the past twenty years, China has been less vocal 
in its support for the Palestinians, preferring instead to continue to 
publicly champion itself as a supporter of the developing world and 
emphasize diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.107  At 
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the United Nations, China consistently votes in favor of resolutions 
supporting Palestinian self-determination and condemning Israeli 
uses of force against the Palestinians and the Israeli settlement 
enterprise.108  However, much of its diplomacy in the region, at least 
as it relates to Palestine, is set in the broader context of the so-called 
Middle East “peace process,” as China appears to have signed onto 
the international consensus.  For example, it has expressed support 
for the 1991 Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, the 2002 Road 
Map, and the 2007 Annapolis Conference.109   At the same time, 
China has also been fostering closer political, military, and economic 
ties with Israel.  For example, when Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu visited China in 2017, the two countries signed ten 
bilateral agreements with a value of more than $25 billion.110  China 
has also been investing in infrastructure projects in Israel as well as 
the country’s high technology, agriculture, food, water, and biotech 
sectors.111  On the political-military front, however, relations remain 
cool: arms sales between the two countries have been limited as a 
result of pressure from the United States.112  However, since 2011, a 
number of high-level Israeli military delegations have visited China, 
including defense minister Ehud Barak in 2011, who discussed 
 
on-east-jerusalem/ [https://perma.cc/UL3S-NECU] (observing that China’s 
“revolutionary Maoist solidarity was gradually shelved in favor of a discourse of 
peaceful resolution of the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict that would accommodate 
some Israeli demands.”); see also Charlotte Gao, China Takes Bigger Role in Palestine-
Israel Issue as UN Rejects Trump’s Jerusalem Move, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-takes-bigger-role-in-palestine-israel-
issue-as-un-rejects-trumps-jerusalem-move/ [https://perma.cc/P5ZX-4XD3] 
(stating that China may be starting to take on a larger role in the Middle East “Peace 
Process” as the Trump Administration begins to drop any pretense of being a 
neutral peace broker).  
 108 See, e.g., Illegality of Israeli Settlements in Palestinian Territory Occupied 
Since 1967, Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016); Protection of the Palestinian 
Civilian Population, UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/20 (June 13, 2018); 
The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 73/158 (Dec. 17, 2018); Ensuring Accountability and Justice for All 
Violations of International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 
East Jerusalem, UN Human Rights Council Resolution 31/35, A/HRC/29/52 (Mar. 
24, 2016). 
 109 Zambelis, supra note 105. 
 110 Elliott Abrams, What’s Behind Israel’s Growing Ties with China?, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 21, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/whats-
behind-israels-growing-ties-china [https://perma.cc/KYH5-CSJ9]. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/5
2020] Palestinians and Uyghurs in China’s Foreign Policy 1161 
issues such as Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and 
counterterrorism.113 
4. CHINA AND THE UYGHURS: A FRAUGHT RELATIONSHIP 
Xinjiang is an autonomous region114 in northwest China that is 
home to approximately 20 million people from thirteen major ethnic 
groups.115   The largest of these is the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim 
minority who comprise about 8 million of the region’s 20 million 
people.116  Xinjiang first became a part of China around the 1750s, 
though it was not at first colonized or otherwise settled, but rather 
maintained as a strategic border area guarded by thousands of 
Manchu and Chinese troops.117  As a region, Xinjiang experienced 
sporadic bouts of autonomy, beginning with the collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty in the early 20th century until it was fully incorporated into 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949.118  For its part, China claims 
that Xinjiang “has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-
ethnic Chinese nation” since at least 206 B.C.119 
A region little-known to outsiders, Xinjiang, in recent years, has 
made world headlines as bouts of ethnic violence have rocked the 
region.  The most noteworthy occurred in in 2009, when Uyghur 
rioters took to the streets of Urumqi, the region’s capital, and in 2014, 
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when Uyghur assailants killed at least 29 people in a mass stabbing 
attack in Yunnan province.120  These incidents were, however, the 
symptoms of much more deeply-rooted social and economic 
grievances on the part of the Uyghur minority that began as early as 
the 1950s.  It was during the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 and the 
Cultural Revolution that the Uyghurs first experienced the 
suppression of their religion at the hands of the state when their 
religious texts and mosques were destroyed.121  While China began 
to relax its policies toward ethnic minorities between the 1970s and 
1990s, 122  China’s recent drive to develop Xinjiang has increased 
economic disparities between the Uyghurs and recent Han 
immigrants, leading to greater unrest and a concomitant crackdown 
on Uyghur religious life. 
The drive to develop Xinjiang began in 1999 as part of the Great 
Leap West (xibu da kaifa) initiative.123  Although Xinjiang was rich in 
natural resources, throughout the 1960s and 1970s Xinjiang’s 
economy lagged behind that of the rest of China’s provinces as a 
result of isolationist policies designed to counter Soviet influence 
and respond to domestic opposition to the central government’s 
policies.124  Despite the initiation of drastic economic reforms in 1992 
heralded by Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Shenzhen, the benefits of 
development were spread unevenly in favor of China’s eastern 
provinces, and Xinjiang continued to be financially dependent on 
the central government.125  In 1999, however—cognizant of the role 
ethnic division had played in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia and responding to increased separatist violence in 
Xinjiang 126 —President Jiang Zemin announced a one hundred 
billion renminbi (RMB) project to transform the demographic 
makeup of and invest in the infrastructure of the country’s western 
regions, with Xinjiang as the initiative’s main focus.127   Over the 
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years, this project has been facilitated by a massive influx of Han 
migrants 128  who, although initially concentrated in Urumqi, the 
capital of Xinjiang, have spread throughout the region and into 
traditional centers of Uyghur life.129  While Uyghurs accounted for 
over 75% of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, and Han Chinese only 
7%, as of 2009 Uyghurs represented only 46% of the population, 
whereas Hans accounted for at least 40% of the population.130 
The large in-migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang has generated 
a variety of social problems and fueled rising income inequality 
between the Han and Uyghurs.  For example, the NGO Human 
Rights in China reported that Han migration had “reduced human 
access to clean water and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and 
agriculture.” 131   Moreover, on average, the monthly income for 
Uyghur residents of Urumqi was 892 RMB in 2011, compared to 
1,141 RMB for Han Chinese. 132   Ironically, the very economic 
development that China believed would be instrumental in 
promoting ethnic harmony and undermining secessionism in 
Xinjiang133 appears to have had the opposite effect: apart from rising 
income inequality, experts say that Uyghurs are the frequent victims 
of employment discrimination, and many feel that the changing 
demographic balance between Han Chinese and Uyghurs is diluting 
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their culture.134   Much of this repression has been state-directed. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, for example, state authorities embarked 
on a concerted effort to discourage religious observance by 
surveilling mosques and harassing Uyghurs they perceived as too 
religious.135  These policies were part of a broader “securitization” 
campaign by state authorities that, among other things, called for 
“severe” control of mosques, the banning of radio stations and 
confiscation of unauthorized literature, the installation of security 
cameras to surveil residents and houses, and profiling based on 
levels of religious observance. 136   Simultaneously, China also 
embarked on a diplomatic campaign to pressure neighboring 
countries to limit Uyghur separatist activities within their borders.137 
As noted previously, economic disparities and increased state 
repression have only continued to fuel ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and 
led to violent clashes between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.  This has 
led to a downward spiral in which ethnic violence has been met with 
increased security measures, which has only fueled Uyghur 
resentment toward the Han Chinese and the central government. 
Although one might expect Muslim-majority countries in the 
Middle East to harshly rebuke the most recent manifestation of 
China’s “Strike Hard Campaign,” they have, in fact, remained 
largely silent.138  For most China observers, this lack of a response is 
not surprising.  As Professor Michael Clarke observes: 
In the context of the wider Islamic world, . . . the Uyghur 
issue has had only moderate resonance. Many Islamic states, 
particularly in the Middle East, have for the majority of the 
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past decade perceived China to be not only a major source of 
investment and a reliable customer for oil and gas but also a 
potential foil for U.S. dominance in the region.139 
Another reason for Middle Eastern countries’ trepidation with 
confronting China about the Uyghur issue is that, unlike an issue 
like Palestine, which is connected to one of the holiest cities in Islam, 
“China has little place in the cultural imagination of Islam”.140  The 
tepid response of Middle Eastern countries to China’s policy toward 
the Uyghurs has been due in part to China’s ability to “isolat[e] 
government-to-government relations from the Uyghur issue.”141  At 
first, China accomplished this in the 1990s by committing its 
regional neighbors to pursue a “zero tolerance approach” to Uyghur 
separatism. 142   Subsequently, after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks ushered in the so-called Global War on Terror, China framed 
its Uyghur policy as a matter of protecting Xinjiang from Islamic 
terrorism, and in a way both normalized (and internationalized) its 
handling of the Uyghur issue. 143   China has also successfully 
deprived the world of access to Xinjiang and the Uyghurs of access 
to the wider world.  For example, it restricts Uyghur’s freedom of 
movement, punishes them for contacting families living abroad, and 
interrogates and imprisons those with foreign ties.144 At the same 
time, it has also been successful—at least until recently—in 
deflecting media attention away from and controlling media access 
to the region.  As one observer notes, in contrast to the faces of 
persecuted Rohingyas and images of clashes in Palestine, “few 
images are emerging from Xinjiang due to restrictions on press 
access and the massive state censorship apparatus.  That means the 
world sees little more than blurry satellite footage of the internment 
camps.”145 
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5. BEIJING’S BALANCING ACT 
How and to what extent does the Uyghur issue fit into China’s 
policy toward Palestine?  As some observers have noted, there 
appears to be an inherent tension in China’s support for an 
independent (presumably Muslim-majority) Palestinian state while 
at the same time trying to contain the Uyghurs’ national aspirations 
at home.  Aron Shai, for example, writes that “if China persists in 
criticizing Israel and continues to advocate a strict right to self-
determination for Palestinians and Israeli Arab [sic], it could well 
boomerang back and affect her delicate situation in Xinjiang and 
Tibet (another problematic province as far as Beijing is 
concerned.”146  Similarly, Matthew Moneyhon observes that “[i]n its 
dealings with Xinjiang, the party walks a fine line between 
encouraging a safe amount of autonomy (thereby placating and 
neutralizing independence-minded Uighurs) and breeding local 
nationalism or even more dangerous, ‘splittism’—the drive for 
separation from the national body politic.”147  Why does Beijing feel 
the apparent need to temper its support for an independent 
Palestine with an eye toward its problems with the Uyghurs at 
home?  As Graham Fuller and S. Frederick Starr cogently note: 
Nations tend to endorse the struggle of those peoples with 
whom their own interests are linked—or, as often as not, as 
an instrument against opponents.  Governments readily 
apply double standards depending on how such standards 
affect friend and foe and how they relate to their perceptions 
of their own national interests at the moment. 
. . . 
The fact that the Uyghur are also Muslim adds a special 
intensity to the issue because of the high degree of 
interconnectedness that exists among the world-wide 
Muslim community—the umma.  The very existence of an 
umma . . . creates special bonds of awareness and sympathy 
as Muslim minorities increasingly discover other Muslims in 
similar predicaments.148 
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Indeed, in stark contrast to China’s ability to securitize the issue 
in its bilateral relations with its neighbors and largely avoid any 
meaningful criticism of its treatment of Uyghurs at the government 
level, 149  major voices outside of official government institutions 
continue to voice criticism of China’s policies in Xinjiang. 
Contradicting the official Indonesian government line on Xinjiang, 
for example, the Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association (PITI) and 
Muslim-based Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) harshly rebuked 
China for its brutal treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.150  Similarly, a 
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suggested that Egypt’s 
unwillingness to rebuke China over its treatment of Uyghurs was 
borne out of a desire to avoid criticism of its own policy of silencing 
dissent at home.151 
Although there is a logical tension in China’s support for an 
independent Palestinian state and its efforts to suppress calls for 
independence in Xinjiang, I argue that these policies are not 
contradictory and that China has managed to balance the two 
remarkably well in its post-Cold War era international diplomacy. 
As an initial matter, while not entirely consistent on this front, China 
has hewed closely to the distinction drawn by international legal 
jurisprudence and international legal instruments between self-
determination in the context of military occupation and 
decolonization on one hand, and secession on the other. In 
supporting an independent Palestinian state, China has expressed 
its view that Palestinian self-determination falls into the former 
camp, while calls for an independent “East Turkestan,” by contrast, 
belong to the latter.  As a historical matter, China’s support for 
Palestinian independence was a natural outgrowth of its efforts to 
export Chinese socialist revolution abroad and counter American 
imperialism and Soviet influence.  Thus, while Palestine then as now 
did not offer China much in the way of material benefits, it served 
as an ideal export market for its model of Chinese socialist 
revolution and an opportunity to gain a foothold of influence in the 
Middle East when China was only beginning to assert itself on the 
international stage. 
Today, while China no longer actively supports revolutionary 
movements abroad to the extent that it once did, its support for 
Palestine continues to retain a similar, though purely symbolic value 
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for China.  While the need to brand itself as a revolutionary state and 
to counter—as a defensive matter—Soviet influence and U.S. 
imperialism in the region has dissipated, China is now eager to 
proactively extend its influence westward throughout Asia and the 
Middle East and to counter U.S. hegemony in Asia. 152   By 
demonstrating China’s sympathy and support for a people and a 
cause that Middle Eastern countries are similarly sympathetic 
towards, China’s support for Palestine enables it to make further 
inroads into the region.  However, a belief that China’s Palestine 
policy figures prominently into these countries’ calculus regarding 
their relations with Beijing would be misplaced.  As an initial matter, 
while some have argued that China’s support for Palestinian 
independence is intended also to deflect criticism away from its 
treatment of Uyghurs,153 the value China derives from its Palestine 
policy vis-à-vis the “Uyghur issue” is, in my opinion, questionable: 
in its public statements and actions, China has largely refrained 
from—at least explicitly—linking the issues of Palestine and the 
Uyghurs together, and likely for good reason.  China’s regional 
neighbors are keenly aware of China’s actions in Xinjiang,154 but 
both lack the means and the desire to criticize China on this issue in 
light of their own security and economic interests.155   Moreover, 
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China has been able to successfully securitize the Uyghur issue in its 
bilateral relations with regional neighbors and convince them to 
“accede to its conception of the Uyghurs as ‘terrorists, extremists 
and separatists’”.156 
Additionally, one need only look to the massive loans and 
financial aid that Chinese President Xi Jinping has pledged to 
Middle Eastern countries as part of the so-called “Belt and Road 
Initiative” to understand that the projection of China’s influence 
westward is primarily a consequence of its military and economic 
power, rather than simply China’s policy toward a single country.157 
Another reason to doubt that China’s Palestine policy factors 
significantly into Middle Eastern countries’ calculus regarding their 
relationships with Beijing is that, on the whole, these countries 
themselves have largely refrained from playing an active role in 
helping to secure better treatment for Palestinians and an 
independent Palestinian state. 158   However, through minimal 
material and somewhat more rhetorical support for the Palestinians, 
China has managed to facilitate—or at least eliminate one possible 
roadblock to—the creation of a greater role for itself in the Middle 
East, while at the same time not abandoning the Palestinian cause 
outright emboldening secessionist movements at home. 
The question is, of course, whether in China’s calculation of its 
strategic interests, Palestine will continue to play a positive or at 
least neutral role in its foreign policy, or whether its continued 
support for Palestinian independence represents a liability that 
could worsen its secessionist troubles at home.  Though dissimilar, 
the case of North Korea and China’s continued support for the 
regime in Pyongyang suggests that China probably will not 
abandon Palestine anytime soon—at least in its public words and 
diplomacy.   Ultimately, this careful balancing act will continue to 
be facilitated by a lack of reproach from foreign governments about 
China’s treatment of Uyghurs, as well as the careful distinction that 
China—and international law—has drawn between permissible 
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claims of self-determination in the colonial and occupation context 
and generally disfavored secessionist claims. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Both historically and to the present day, Palestine has occupied 
an important symbolic position in China’s foreign policy.  Over the 
years, as China’s interests have evolved and its geopolitical 
influence increased, so too have the fundamental characteristics of 
its policy towards Palestine.  While in the 1950s and 1960s China 
provided moral and material support to Palestine as part of a 
broader strategy of exporting Chinese socialism abroad, China’s 
contemporary Palestine policy has largely been subsumed under the 
mantle of a broader strategy of securing an economic and strategic 
foothold in the Middle East.  In this context, in which the success of 
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” has rested primarily on securing 
lucrative economic and trade deals with Middle Eastern countries 
that have themselves largely eschewed responsibility for and 
expressed a lack of interest in securing peace between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians, China has been able to confine its support for 
Palestine to expressions of support for the so-called Middle East 
“peace process” and corresponding actions at the United Nations. 
Although many scholars have noted the apparent tension in 
China’s support for Palestinian self-determination and its efforts to 
quash Uyghur secessionist elements in Xinjiang, it is unclear 
whether this apparent tension has figured into the calculus of 
Chinese policymakers responsible for policy toward Xinjiang and 
Palestine respectively.  To the extent that it has, I argue that it has 
only done so minimally.  Palestine offers little to nothing to China in 
terms of its interests in the Middle East—especially given other 
Middle Eastern countries’ lack of interest in the Palestine issue—and 
China has generally been successful in “securitizing” the issue of 
Xinjiang in its relations with its regional neighbors and 
characterizing its Xinjiang policy as a matter of internal affairs. 
Moreover, China at least outwardly benefits from the failure of the 
international community to draw parallels between Xinjiang and 
Palestine—though this has not prevented human rights groups from 
doing so.  In the context of international law, however, the 
seemingly uneasy coexistence of China’s Palestine and Xinjiang 
policies fits comfortably into the distinction drawn between 
permissible claims of self-determination in the context of 
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decolonization on one hand, and impermissible secessionist claims 
on the other. 
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